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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
         Plaintiff SmithKline Beecham Corp. ("SKB") brought this 
declaratory judgment action against the defendant, Rohm and Haas 
Co. ("R&H"), seeking equitable apportionment of the costs of the 
clean-up of a contaminated site in Myerstown, Pennsylvania under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C.  9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V).  
Alternatively, SKB sought apportionment of the clean-up costs in 
accordance with the indemnification provisions of a Purchase 
Agreement between SKB and R&H. 
         In 1978, SKB purchased Whitmoyer Laboratories, Inc. 
("New Whitmoyer") from R&H under a Purchase Agreement containing 
certain indemnification provisions.  Although R&H and SKB 
discharged toxic wastes, most of the contamination at the 
Myerstown site occurred before 1964, when the site was owned by 
R&H's predecessor ("Old Whitmoyer"). 
         The able and experienced district court held the 
indemnifications in the Purchase Agreement covered CERCLA 
liability arising from R&H's ownership of the site.  In addition, 
the court held the doctrine of corporate successor liability by 
de facto merger brought CERCLA liability arising from the conduct 
of Old Whitmoyer within the scope of the indemnity clauses of the 
Purchase Agreement.  Consequently, the court allocated all of the 
clean-up costs for CERCLA liability arising from the conduct of 
Old Whitmoyer to R&H.  R&H brought this appeal. 
         On appeal, we must determine whether the contractual 
indemnity provisions of the Purchase Agreement were intended to 
allocate the environmental liability of Old Whitmoyer, the 
original owner of the property.  Because the Purchase Agreement 
does not indemnify for CERCLA clean-up costs arising prior to New 
Whitmoyer's ownership of the Myerstown site, we will reverse the 
district court.  In addition, we believe that under the facts of 
this case the doctrine of de facto merger cannot be used to 
modify an indemnity provision drafted by two sophisticated 
corporations. 
                            I.  Facts 
         In 1931, Dr. Clarence W. Whitmoyer founded a veterinary 
feedstock and pharmaceutical business based in Myerstown, 
Pennsylvania.  Incorporated as "Whitmoyer Laboratories, Inc." in 
1934, the corporation went public in 1961 ("Old Whitmoyer").  
From 1957 to 1964, Old Whitmoyer deposited large quantities of 
arsenic-laden hazardous waste on the grounds of its Myerstown 
plant.   
         In 1964 defendant Rohm and Haas ("R&H") created W-L, 
Inc., a Delaware corporation, as a wholly owned subsidiary.  W-L 
Inc. purchased the assets of Old Whitmoyer and assumed certain 
specified balance sheet liabilities in exchange for 50,000 R&H 
shares.  Subsequently, Old Whitmoyer changed its name and took 
steps to dissolve, distributing the R&H stock to its 
shareholders.  R&H did not know of the contamination at the 
Myerstown site when its subsidiary purchased the assets of Old 
Whitmoyer. 
         W-L Inc., took the name Whitmoyer Laboratories, Inc. 
("New Whitmoyer") and continued to run the business of Old 
Whitmoyer.  New Whitmoyer retained the same CEO as Old Whitmoyer, 
manufactured the same products under the same name, and sold 
those products to the same customers.  From 1964 to 1978, New 
Whitmoyer disposed of additional arsenic-contaminated waste at 
the Myerstown site.  But New Whitmoyer also undertook efforts to 
remediate groundwater contamination.  Shortly after acquisition, 
it supplied bottled water to over twenty neighbors of the plant 
whose wells had been contaminated with arsenic.  In 1965, New 
Whitmoyer removed over three million pounds of contaminated 
wastes and soil skimmings from the existing waste lagoon and 
stored them in a concrete vault built specially for that purpose.  
In addition, New Whitmoyer devised a method to monitor and remove 
arsenic waste from the groundwater.  Between 1965 and 1971, 
almost 450,000 pounds of arsenic were removed from the 
groundwater at the site. 
         On March 31, 1978, R&H sold its entire animal health 
products business, including all the stock of New Whitmoyer, to 
Beecham Inc., a predecessor of the plaintiff SmithKline Beecham 
Corporation.  Before completing the transaction, R&H notified 
SKB of the bottled water obligation, showed SKB executives the 
vault and told them it contained arsenic wastes, and gave them 
free access to all records at New Whitmoyer. 
         The Purchase Agreement that governed the sale between 
SKB and R&H ("1978 Purchase Agreement") contains a broad 
indemnification clause in which R&H indemnified SKB against 
"[a]ll material liabilities relating to the conduct of the 
Business prior to the First Closing Date."  In addition, SKB 
agreed to indemnify R&H for all losses and liabilities "resulting 
from the operation of the Business by the Buyer after the First 
Closing Date."  During SKB's ownership of New Whitmoyer, arsenic- 
laden waste continued to be released into the environment at the 
Myerstown site. 
         Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980.  Two years later, SKB 
sold New Whitmoyer to Stafford Laboratories, Inc. ("Stafford").  
Stafford was a small, undercapitalized company with limited 
assets and no experience in chemical manufacturing operations.  
Its president was a felon with two prior convictions for grand 
theft and embezzlement.  Stafford has since filed for bankruptcy 
and has not been named as a party in this action. 
         In 1986, the federal government placed the Myerstown 
site on the Superfund National Priorities List under  105 of 
CERCLA.  42 U.S.C.  9605.  Both R&H and SKB were deemed 
"potentially responsible parties" liable for the contamination at 
the Myerstown site under CERCLA.  In 1992, the United States 
settled its CERCLA liability claims against R&H and SKB, 
resulting in the entry of a consent judgment.  United States v. 
Rohm and Haas Co., Civ. No. 92-CV-1295 (M.D. Pa.).  Although Old 
Whitmoyer caused the majority of the contamination before New 
Whitmoyer owned the Myerstown site, under the consent decree R&H 
and SKB are jointly and severally liable for the entire cost of 
its remediation because of their successive ownership of New 
Whitmoyer.  Estimated clean-up costs total $123 million. 
         SKB brought this action against the R&H seeking an 
equitable apportionment of clean-up costs under sections 107(a) 
and 113(f) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.  9607(a) and 9613(f), and 
enforcement of the indemnity provisions of the 1978 Purchase 
Agreement. 
         On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district 
court held R&H liable for clean-up of wastes dumped during the 
period when New Whitmoyer was an R&H subsidiary--1964 to 1978-- 
based on the indemnification provision of the 1978 Purchase 
Agreement.  SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 854 F. 
Supp. 1201, 1214-15 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  But it did not allocate 
liability for Old Whitmoyer's share of clean-up costs because "at 
this stage of the proceedings, the court cannot find as a matter 
of law that [the indemnification] includes conduct of [Old] 
Whitmoyer Laboratories before R & H purchased it in 1964."  Id.at 1214. 
         The district court took testimony on the 
indemnification provision in the 1978 Purchase Agreement.  It 
found it unnecessary to determine whether the indemnification 
expressly included Old Whitmoyer's contamination because it 
determined New Whitmoyer was liable for Old Whitmoyer's 
contamination as its corporate successor under Pennsylvania's de 
facto merger doctrine.  It then found the indemnification 
provision required R&H to indemnify SKB for all New Whitmoyer's 
pre-closing liabilities, including successor liability for Old 
Whitmoyer's conduct.  SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm and Haas 
Co., No. 92-5394 (E.D. Pa. March 17, 1995). 
         On appeal, R&H argues the indemnity provision of the 
1978 Purchase Agreement does not indemnify against environmental 
liabilities arising under CERCLA.  Even if the provision covers 
CERCLA liability, R&H contends it does not indemnify SKB for Old 
Whitmoyer's conduct.  Finally, R&H claims the district court 
should not have applied the de facto merger doctrine to make R&H 
liable for Old Whitmoyer's contamination of the Myerstown site. 
         We exercise plenary review of the district court's 
construction of the 1978 Purchase Agreement.  Vanguard 
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 900 
F.2d 645, 650 (3d Cir. 1990).  We also have plenary review of the 
district court's interpretation and prediction of Pennsylvania's 
de facto merger doctrine.  Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co., 995 F.2d 457, 459 (3d Cir. 1993).  We have jurisdiction to 
review the district court's final judgment under 28 U.S.C.  1291 
(1994). 
 
                         II.  Discussion 
                 A.  The Indemnity Covers CERCLA 
                                1. 
         Under  107(e)(1) of CERCLA, parties may provide 
indemnifications for environmental response costs.  Section 
107(e)(1) provides: 
         No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar 
         agreement or conveyance shall be effective to 
         transfer from the owner or operator of any 
         vessel or facility or from any person who may 
         be liable for a release or threat of release 
         under this section, to any other person the 
         liability under this section.  Nothing in 
         this subsection shall bar any agreement to 
         insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party 
         to such agreement for any liability under 
         this section. 
42 U.S.C.  9607(e)(1).  We have reconciled these apparently 
inconsistent provisions by interpreting them to mean "agreements 
to indemnify or hold harmless are enforceable between the parties 
but not against the government."  Beazer East, Inc. v. Mead 
Corp., 34 F.3d 206, 211 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Smith Land & 
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989)), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 1696 (1995).  Thus responsible parties can lawfully allocate 
CERCLA response costs among themselves while remaining jointly 
and severally liable to the government for the entire clean-up. 
         We apply state law to determine whether a particular 
indemnification provision encompasses CERCLA response costs.  
Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace Co., 59 F.3d 400, 405 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Beazer East, 34 F.3d at 214.  In this case, the 1978 Purchase 
Agreement provides, and the parties agree, that the indemnity 
provision "will be governed by and construed in accordance with 
the laws of the State of New Jersey."  Accordingly we must 
determine whether, under New Jersey law, the parties intended to 
indemnify for CERCLA response costs. 
         Contract interpretation is usually a question of law in 
New Jersey.  Dome Petroleum Ltd. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. 
Co., 767 F.2d 43, 47 (3d Cir. 1985).  Under New Jersey law, 
courts should interpret a contract considering "the objective 
intent manifested in the language of the contract in light of the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction."  Id. 
                                2. 
         In this case the parties could not have expressly 
included CERCLA liabilities in the indemnification clause because 
the 1978 Purchase Agreement pre-dates the enactment of CERCLA.  
But an agreement can require one party to indemnify another 
against CERCLA response costs even if it was executed before the 
enactment of CERCLA.  Beazer East, 34 F.2d at 211.  A pre-CERCLA 
indemnification provision covers response costs if it is either 
"specific enough to include CERCLA liability or general enough to 
include any and all environmental liability . . . ."  Id. 
         The district court held the indemnification provisions 
in the 1978 Purchase Agreement are broad enough to incorporate 
CERCLA response costs.  Section 3 of the 1978 Purchase Agreement, 
entitled "Allocation of Liability/Indemnification," contains 
three subsections allocating potential liabilities between SKB 
and R&H.  Subsection 3.1 is entitled "Allocation of Liability."  
Under this subsection SKB agreed to assume "as of the First 
Closing Date" certain specified liabilities of R&H pertaining to 
the Business.  These liabilities do not include costs for 
environmental clean-up.  The remaining two subsections provide 
the parties' indemnifications.  In subsection 3.2(a) R&H agreed 
to indemnify and hold SKB harmless from: 
         (a)  All material liabilities relating to the 
         conduct of the Business prior to the First 
         Closing Date (regardless when the related 
         claim may be asserted), whether accrued, 
         absolute, contingent or otherwise, which are 
         not assumed by the Buyer under Subsection 3.1 
         . . . . 
Subsection 3.3(a) is a reciprocal provision in which SKB 
indemnifies R&H for: 
         (a)  All losses, liabilities, damages or 
         deficiencies to Seller resulting from the 
         operation of the Business by the Buyer after 
         the First Closing Date . . . . 
         These indemnity provisions divide "all" of the 
"liabilities" concerning the "operation of the Business" between 
SKB and R&H.  This sort of broad language in pre-CERCLA contracts 
has been construed by courts to encompass CERCLA liability.  For 
example, in Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 5 F.3d 10, 
15-16 (2d Cir. 1993), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
held an indemnity provision covering "all liabilities, 
obligations and indebtedness of [the business] as they exist on 
the Closing Date or arise thereafter with respect to actions or 
failures to act occurring prior to the Closing Date" was 
sufficiently broad to encompass CERCLA liability. 
         Similarly, the District Court for the Western District 
of New York held a provision indemnifying for "all liabilities 
and obligations . . relating to or arising out of the Assets" was 
expansive enough to include CERCLA liability insofar as such 
liability related to or arose out of assets transferred.  
Purolator Products Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 
124, 131 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); see also, American Nat'l Can Co. v. 
Kerr Glass Mfg. Corp., No. 89-C-0168, 1990 WL 125368, *3 (N.D. 
Ill. August 22, 1990) (indemnity provision covering "any claim of 
any kind or nature whatsoever with respect to the business . . . 
arising out of facts or events occurring prior to the Closing 
Time" was sufficiently broad to encompass CERCLA liability), 
reconsidered in part, No. 89-C-0168, 1990 WL 129657 (N.D. Ill. 
August 30, 1990) (reaffirming this holding). 
         We believe the language in the 1978 Purchase Agreement 
indemnity provisions clearly expresses the parties' intent to 
allocate all present and future liabilities.  Environmental 
liabilities are among the future unknown liabilities allocated by 
the parties.  Accordingly we agree with the district court that 
the indemnity provisions are general enough to evidence the 
parties intent to include CERCLA response costs. 
               B.  Temporal Scope of the Indemnity 
                                1. 
         Although we have found the 1978 Purchase Agreement 
indemnity provisions encompass CERCLA response costs, we must 
still determine whether R&H indemnified SKB for those clean-up 
costs attributable to Old Whitmoyer before R&H, through its 
wholly-owned subsidiary, New Whitmoyer, purchased the assets of 
that company in 1964.  SKB believes it is indemnified against all 
liabilities that arose prior to its purchase of New Whitmoyer.  
Accordingly, it argues R&H is responsible for all of Old 
Whitmoyer's CERCLA response costs.  In contrast, R&H claims the 
indemnity provisions do not include Old Whitmoyer's liabilities 
and, consequently, those liabilities must be apportioned 
equitably under CERCLA.  
         In subsection 3.2(a) R&H indemnified SKB for the 
liabilities of the Business "prior to the First Closing Date."  
SKB indemnified R&H for the corresponding liabilities "after the 
First Closing Date" in subsection 3.3(a).  SKB argues these 
provisions clearly divide all liabilities between the parties 
according to the date of sale of New Whitmoyer to SKB in 1978.  
According to SKB, R&H is responsible for all liabilities 
resulting from activities before the 1978 closing date, including 
liabilities arising from the conduct of Old Whitmoyer before New 
Whitmoyer's purchase of the assets of that company in 1964. 
         R&H argues the dividing line of the date of sale only 
allocated risks relating to the conduct of the business by New 
Whitmoyer, not Old Whitmoyer.  In subsection 3.2(a), R&H agreed 
to indemnify SKB only for "material liabilities relating to the 
conduct of the Business" prior to the date of sale.  R&H claims 
the definition of "Business" does not include Old Whitmoyer and 
therefore R&H never agreed to indemnify SKB for the conduct of 
Old Whitmoyer. 
         The definition of "Business" appears in the first 
recital to the 1978 Purchase Agreement: 
         WHEREAS, Seller manufactures and sells, and 
         conducts research relating to, a line of 
         animal health products . . . and such 
         business is conducted primarily by Whitmoyer 
         Laboratories, Inc., a Delaware corporation 
         ("WL"), WL's "Affiliated Laboratories" and 
         "Barker, Moore, and Mein" divisions and 
         certain foreign subsidiaries and distributors 
         . . . The worldwide operations of such 
         business, together with all the assets 
         relating thereto . . . are referred to herein 
         as "Business". 
R&H emphasizes "Business" is defined in this passage as 
"Whitmoyer Laboratories, Inc., a Delaware Corporation" and 
affiliates of R&H.  This language suggests the term "Business" is 
limited to New Whitmoyer and other subsidiaries owned by R&H at 
the time of the 1978 transaction.  Since R&H never owned Old 
Whitmoyer, R&H concludes Old Whitmoyer is not included in the 
definition of "Business." 
         SKB contends this clause is "actually more of a 
description than a 'definition'," serving only to differentiate 
R&H's animal health products business from other R&H operations 
not included in the sale.  SKB examines the 1978 Purchase 
Agreement as a whole and argues R&H's proposed definition of 
"Business" is inconsistent with the general usage of the term 
throughout the agreement.  Specifically, SKB notes the term 
"Business" is modified in several locations by the words "by 
Seller" and "by Buyer."  According to SKB, this modification 
would not be necessary if "Business" meant "business run by New 
Whitmoyer and certain other R&H subsidiaries." 
                                2. 
         Regardless of whether "Business" is conceived of as a 
"definition" or a "description," the term clearly does not 
encompass Old Whitmoyer.  If the parties intended a more general 
usage of "Business," they could have specifically included Old 
Whitmoyer in the first recital.  Alternatively, the parties could 
have excluded the defining provision from the 1978 Purchase 
Agreement altogether.  Instead R&H and SKB chose to capitalize 
the term "Business" and give it a particular, restricted meaning. 
         We cannot ignore the express language of the contract.  
See e.g, Communications Workers of America, Local 1087 v. 
Monmouth County Bd. of Social Servs., 476 A.2d 777, 782 (N.J. 
1984) ("The starting point in ascertaining [the parties'] intent 
is the language of the contract.").  The 1978 Purchase Agreement 
explicitly provides the "Business" is "Whitmoyer Laboratories, 
Inc. a Delaware corporation ("WL")."  Section 9.3 of the 1978 
Purchase Agreement states "WL is a corporation duly organized, 
validly existing and in good standing" under Delaware law, with 
its certificate of incorporation, as amended, "attached hereto as 
Exhibit T."  That exhibit contains a certificate of incorporation 
for the corporation formed June 12, 1964, not the predecessor 
corporation that was incorporated in 1934. 
         Nowhere in the "definition" or "description" of 
"Business" is there a suggestion that the meaning of "Business" 
incorporates the predecessors of, or the prior owners of the 
assets of New Whitmoyer.  SKB contends the use of the term in 
other sections of the 1978 Purchase Agreement indicates the 
parties intended a broader meaning than the one they expressly 
provided.  It argues modification of "Business" with the words 
"by Buyer" creates an oxymoron under R&H's reading.  In addition, 
it claims modification of "Business" with "by Seller" is 
redundant if "Business" is limited to "the business owned by 
R&H." 
         But SKB admits "in the large majority of instances, the 
Agreement uses the words 'the Business' without express reference 
to Buyer or Seller."  We do not think the explicit definition of 
"Business" should be disregarded because in a few instances the 
term was used in an incongruous or redundant manner.  Examination 
of the contract as a whole confirms that the term was used 
appropriately throughout the document.  We will not contravene 
the parties' apparent "objective intent" on the basis of a few 
isolated phrases.  See Joseph Hilton & Assocs., Inc. v. Evans, 
492 A.2d 1062, 1070 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) ("In construing 
the contract the court does not focus on an isolated phrase but 
reads the contract as a whole . . . .") cert. denied, 501 A.2d 
977 (N.J. 1985).  Reading the contract to avoid ambiguities, we 
conclude the parties intended "Business" to mean exactly what 
they said, "Whitmoyer Laboratories, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation."  See United States Bronze Powders, Inc. v. Commerce 
& Indus. Ins. Co., 611 A.2d 667, 670 (N.J Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1992) ("The court should read [contract] provisions so as to 
avoid ambiguities, if the plain meaning of the contract 
permits."). 
         The first recital of the 1978 Purchase Agreement 
provides a specific, and restricted, explanation of the term 
"Business."  There is no indication in this explanation, or in 
any other provision of the contract, that the term "Business" 
includes Old Whitmoyer.  The few minor inconsistencies 
highlighted by SKB do not justify a rewriting of the contract, 
particularly since the term is used appropriately throughout.  
Viewing the contract as a whole, we hold the term "Business" does 
not include Old Whitmoyer. 
                   C.  De Facto Merger Doctrine 
         The district court did not decide whether the term 
"Business" included Old Whitmoyer because it held New Whitmoyer 
liable for Old Whitmoyer's CERCLA response cost under 
Pennsylvania's de facto merger doctrine.  The court held New 
Whitmoyer incurred Old Whitmoyer's tort liabilities by virtue of 
the 1964 asset purchase transaction and New Whitmoyer subsequent 
conduct of the business.  Even under R&H's interpretation of 
"Business," the court found the indemnity R&H gave for the 
liabilities of New Whitmoyer included successor liability for the 
conduct of Old Whitmoyer.  Consequently, the court held R&H must 
indemnify SKB for remediation costs relating to Old Whitmoyer's 
conduct. 
         R&H does not dispute that the factors indicative of a 
de facto merger are present in this case.  But it argues the 
doctrine should not be applied to alter the temporal scope of the 
indemnification clause.  In addition, R&H contends application of 
successor liability in this case conflicts with policy 
considerations underlying CERCLA and the de facto merger 
doctrine. 
                                1. 
         R&H claims the parties should be able to allocate 
liability through contractual indemnities without the hindrance  
of judge-made doctrine.  Because the parties did not allocate Old 
Whitmoyer's liabilities in the indemnification provisions, it 
argues against application of the de facto merger doctrine to 
hold it responsible for Old Whitmoyer's clean-up costs. 
         In Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 
303, 318 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985), we held 
the de facto merger doctrine will not shift environmental 
liabilities where the parties were in a position to protect 
themselves through a contractual provision.  Hercules, 762 F.2d 
at 317-18.  In Hercules, we found the requirement of an express 
indemnification is particularly important where, as here, the 
parties are two sophisticated corporations of roughly equal 
resources.  Id. at 313 (where "corporations of roughly equal 
resources contract for the sale of an industrial property, and 
especially where the dispute is over a condition on the land 
rather than a structure, caveat emptor remains the rule.") 
(footnote omitted). 
         In this case, the parties drafted an indemnification 
provision that excluded successor liability.  SKB and R&H chose 
to define "Business" and limit its meaning to New Whitmoyer.  
Under these circumstances, we believe it was not appropriate for 
the district court to apply the de facto merger doctrine to alter 
the effect of the indemnification provision.  See American Nat'l 
Can Co. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., No. 89-C-0168, 1990 WL 
125368 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 1990) (no indemnification because 
indemnity did not specifically apply to predecessor corporation's 
liabilities) (applying Pennsylvania law), reconsidered in part, 
No. 89-C-0168, 1990 WL 129657 (N.D. Ill., August 30, 1990) 
(addressing de facto merger). 
         Our holding does not alter the general applicability of 
corporate successor doctrines in CERCLA contribution claims.  SeeSmith 
Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (statutory merger) (successor corporation was liable 
for prior corporation's CERCLA liability in the absence of an 
indemnification clause), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989).  But 
where two sophisticated corporations drafted an indemnification 
provision that excluded the liabilities of a predecessor 
corporation, we will not use the de facto merger doctrine to 
circumvent the parties' objective intent. 
                                2. 
         R&H also contends application of the de facto merger 
doctrine would undermine CERCLA's remedial policies.  Under 
CERCLA, the cost of remediation is allocated equitably if the 
parties have not apportioned it by contract.  42 U.S.C.  
9613(f)(1).  Of course, the parties here have allocated their 
responsibilities under the contractual indemnification 
provisions, which exclude the liabilities of Old Whitmoyer. 
         In this case, the parties agree each is responsible for 
the costs of cleaning up their own contamination.  But neither 
party caused Old Whitmoyer's contamination.  Applying the de 
facto merger doctrine to require R&H to fund all of the clean-up 
expenses for Old Whitmoyer's contamination would contravene the 
express terms of the indemnification provision and incidentally 
would "frustrate[] Congress' desire to encourage clean-up by any 
responsible party," id., and force R&H to pay for the entire 
response cost despite the relative culpability of the parties, 
see id. (refusing to apply the doctrine of caveat emptor to a 
CERCLA cost recovery action because the doctrine "bar[s] relief 
regardless of the degree of culpability of the parties, [and 
therefore does] not comport with congressional objectives.").  
Our refusal to apply the de facto merger doctrine to alter the 
terms of the indemnity provision leaves both SKB and R&H 
responsible for their fair share of the clean-up costs of the 
Myerstown site.  See Beazer East, 34 F.2d at 219 (CERCLA policy 
favors equitable apportionment of remediation costs). 
                                3. 
         In In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 367 F. Supp. 1158, 
1170 (E.D. Pa. 1973), the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held "the de facto merger 
doctrine is a judge-made device for avoiding the patent injustice 
which might befall a party simply because a merger has been 
called something else."  The doctrine is an equitable rule, a 
judicial creation to protect a particular class of plaintiffs 
from the consequences of a transaction over which they have no 
control.  The doctrine should conform to the rule's remedial 
purpose.  See Hercules, 762 F.2d at 312 ("We believe that the de 
facto merger doctrine is supported by 'social policy 
considerations' independent of any particular cause of action . . 
. .")  (citations omitted). 
         In this case SKB (together with R&H) had control over 
the assignment of environmental liability through the negotiation 
of the 1978 Purchase Agreement.  Thus, there is no third party 
whose interests have been impaired by forces beyond their 
control.  We decline to apply de facto merger doctrine under 
these circumstances.  SKB is not within the class of plaintiffs 
that were intended to benefit from the de facto merger doctrine 
and use of the doctrine would contravene CERCLA's remedial 
purpose.   
                               III. 
         For these reasons we will reverse the judgment of the 
district court and remand to determine the parties relative 
responsibilities for Old Whitmoyer's contamination under CERCLA's 
equitable apportionment provisions. 
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STAPLETON, J., Dissenting: 
         I join Sections I and II-A of the court's opinion.  I 
would affirm, however, because I conclude that the 1978 purchase 
agreement unambiguously requires R&H to indemnify SKB for the 
costs of the cleanup of pre-1964 contamination.   
         The relevant provisions of the agreement are quite 
straightforward.  Not surprisingly, the agreement begins by 
describing in its preamble the business being transferred from 
the "Seller" to the "Buyer."  That business is described in terms 
of business "operations" and the assets associated therewith.  
The preamble recites that "Seller manufactures and sells, and 
conducts research and development relating to, a line of animal 
health products, including veterinary pharmaceuticals, vaccines 
and diet supplements."  It states that "such business" is 
currently "conducted primarily by" New Whitmoyer and its 
affiliates and then lists a number of products, projects, and 
rights that are included in "such business."  Finally, the 
preamble stipulates that "[t]he worldwide operations of such 
business, together with all of the assets relating thereto  
. . . , are referred to herein as the 'Business'."   
         In section 3.1 of the agreement, the Buyer assumes 
specifically described liabilities.  In subsection 3.2, R&H 
"indemnifies and holds Buyer . . . harmless from and against and 
in respect of:  
 
              (a)  All material liabilities relating 
         to the conduct of the Business prior to the 
         First Closing Date (regardless when the 
         related claim may be asserted) whether 
         accrued, absolute, contingent, or otherwise, 
         which are not assumed by Buyer pursuant to 
         Subsection 3.1." 
In a reciprocal section, section 3.3, Buyer "indemnifies and 
holds RandH and its officers, directors and stockholders harmless 
from and against and in respect of: 
              (a)  All losses, liabilities, damages or 
         deficiencies to seller resulting from the 
         operation of the Business by the Buyer after 
         the First Closing Date . . . ." 
         As the opinion of the court acknowledges "the language 
in the 1978 Purchase Agreement indemnity provisions clearly 
expresses the parties' intent to allocate all present and future 
liabilities" relating to the business being transferred.  (Maj. 
Op. at 11.)  Putting aside the liabilities specifically assumed 
in section 3.1, R&H is to bear the ultimate responsibility for 
"all material liabilities relating to the conduct of the 
Business" prior to the closing date and SKB is to bear the 
ultimate responsibility for all liabilities "resulting from the 
operation of the Business by the Buyer" after that date.  Insofar 
as liabilities arising from the business being transferred before 
the closing date are concerned, the responsibility of R&H is not 
limited to liabilities arising out of its operation of the 
business being transferred.  This is in sharp contrast to the 
responsibility of SKB which is limited to liabilities "resulting 
from the operation of the Business by Buyer."  (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
         I do not understand R&H to dispute that the preamble of 
the agreement describes the business that is being transferred.  
Moreover, it acknowledges, as it must, that the business 
conducted by Old Whitmoyer from 1957 to 1964 is a part of the 
business being transferred.  It necessarily follows, I believe, 
that the liabilities at issue here were "material liabilities 
relating to the conduct of the Business prior to the" closing 
date. 
         The court fails to focus on the obvious fact that 
"Business" as defined or described in the preamble consists of 
the operations and assets being transferred by the agreement.  
Understandably, those operations and associated assets are 
identified in part by reference to the legal entities that were 
conducting most of those operations at the time the agreement was 
entered.  But as the parties were aware, those operations had 
been conducted for a number of years and R&H's responsibilities 
under section 3.2 were obviously not intended to be limited to 
liabilities arising out of the conduct of those operations at the 
time the agreement was entered.  R&H, of course, acknowledges 
this.  At the same time, however, it tries to limit its 
responsibility to those liabilities arising out of its conduct of 
the business between 1964 when it purchased the business and the 
closing date in 1978.  Neither the text of section 3.2 nor 
anything else in the agreement provides a basis for such a 
limitation.  R&H's indemnity responsibilities under the agreement 
are simply not limited to liabilities relating to the conduct of 
the operations being transferred while those operations and 
assets were under its control.  The parties did not leave pre- 
1964 liabilities of the business out of their agreement for 
future resolution by a court.  R&H unequivocally committed itself 
to indemnify SKB for "all material liabilities relating to the 
conduct of [the operations and assets being transferred] prior to 
the . . . Closing Date."  The liabilities at issue here are 
clearly among those liabilities.  
